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overview and macroeconomic issues
Korea’s near-Term economic ProsPecTs and cHaLLenGes
By Subir Lall and Leif Lybecker Eskesen
introduction
Following several years of strong expansion, the 
Korean economy began losing momentum in the 
second half of 2008 in the wake of the stress engulf-
ing the global financial system. Although the initial 
stages of the financial crisis directly affected mainly 
the United States and western Europe, the crisis be-
came truly global during the course of 2008 as rising 
risk aversion among cross-border investors reduced 
capital flows and weakening demand adversely af-
fected global trade. The more open economies, such 
as Korea’s, were hit the hardest.
In the face of this sharp downturn, the Korean econ-
omy confronts a number of challenges in the short 
to medium term. Softening the impact of the global 
slowdown and restoring strong growth are the most 
important immediate tasks, and the Korean govern-
ment’s policy response in the financial, monetary, 
and fiscal areas has been comprehensive. Over the 
medium term, it will be important to pave the way 
for an even stronger and more dynamic financial 
sector, establish a sound and vibrant corporate sec-
tor (especially small- and medium-size enterprises 
[SMEs]), and resume fiscal consolidation, especially 
to meet the challenges stemming from a rapidly 
aging population.1
The rest of this paper elaborates further on these 
themes. The next section discusses macroeconomic 
and financial developments in 2008 and early 2009 
and their implications for the near-term outlook. 
Given the importance of global developments for 
Korea, the subsequent section discusses the key 
risks and uncertainties surrounding the global eco-
nomic outlook. The paper then discusses risks to 
the Korean economy that originate from domestic 
factors and the key challenges in managing the 
downturn. The final section concludes with some 
observations on prospects.
Korea’s current economic downturn
After peaking toward the end of 2007 and against the 
backdrop of a deteriorating external environment, 
Korea’s growth moderated in the first three quarters 
of 2008 as private consumption and investment 
began to soften. Nevertheless, the Korean economy 
remained relatively resilient to the global economic 
downturn and the substantial stress in global finan-
cial markets. Indeed, exports held up relatively well, 
and the direct impact of the global financial crisis 
was minor given Korean banks’ small exposure to 
subprime securities and structured instruments. At 
the same time, inflationary pressures rose as global 
commodity prices continued to trend up until mid-
summer 2008. Moreover, money and credit growth 
remained strong. In line with regional developments, 
however, the stock market declined (Figure 1), mar-
ket volatility rose, credit spreads widened (Figure 2), 
and the exchange rate weakened.
The abrupt deterioration in global financial condi-
tions in September 2008, in the wake of the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, hit Korea particularly hard. 
As global deleveraging intensified, the liquidity of 
Korea’s bond and equity markets allowed foreign 
investors to unwind their holdings more easily than 
in some less liquid markets. Investor attention also 
focused on some country-specific vulnerabilities, 
including domestic banks’ exposure to wholesale 
1. Jerald Schiff and Murtaza Syed, “The Graying of Korea: Addressing the Challenges of Aging,” Korea’s Economy 2008 24 
(2008): 7–13.
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and external funding and the high leverage of 
households and the SME sector. The reduction in 
liquidity was felt acutely in domestic money mar-
kets, where spreads on corporate paper, for example, 
rose sharply. Moreover, external funding condi-
tions tightened for banks rolling over their foreign 
exchange–denominated short-term debt. The stock 
market sell-off accelerated sharply, and the currency 
weakened substantially. Decisive policy actions by 
the Bank of Korea to inject liquidity into the financial 
system and other measures to support the banking 
and corporate sectors (see below) helped stabilize 
conditions by December 2008. However, financial 
markets have not fully normalized thus far.
With the global economy continuing to deteriorate, 
the demand for Korean exports began to weaken 
appreciably in the final quarter of 2008, and exports 
of goods and services fell 6.9 percent in real terms 
compared with the last quarter of 2007. As imports 
fell even further, however, external trade contributed 
positively to growth. Meanwhile, domestic demand 
continued to weaken in line with waning business 
and consumer confidence. As a result, the economy 
contracted by an annual 3.4 percent and a quarterly 
5.1 percent (seasonally adjusted) in the final quarter, 
leading to full-year growth of 2.2 percent in 2008 
compared with 5.1 percent in 2007 (Figure 3). There 
are, nonetheless, tentative signs that the decelera-
tion in economic activity is moderating. Quarterly 
GDP growth (seasonally adjusted) turned marginally 
positive in the first quarter of 2009 (0.1 percent) 
according to preliminary official estimates, in part 
driven by strong fiscal support and the effects of 
the weaker exchange rate on exports and imports. 
At the same time, the rapid decline in imports also 
reflects waning domestic demand, and labor market 
conditions continue to worsen.
Against the background of weak domestic demand 
and declining exports, the International Monetary 
Fund forecast Korea’s economy to contract by 
around 4 percent this year, in part reflecting the 
base effect associated with the substantial contrac-
tion in activity in the last quarter of 2008. A modest 
recovery in the global economy and an improvement 
in global financial conditions by 2010 could sup-
port a simultaneous recovery in Korea. Indeed, the 
authorities’ strong macroeconomic policy response 
(see below) could raise growth in 2010 above that 
for the major advanced economies and other newly 
industrialized countries in Asia. Moreover, coupled 
with successful crisis policy implementation in the 
advanced economies, this could present an upside 
risk to the growth outlook. However, the unusually 
high uncertainty surrounding the global economic 
and financial conditions implies that projections 
for Korea are also subject to a substantial degree 
of uncertainty. The risks to the downside stem 
from both global conditions and country-specific 
circumstances, which are discussed in turn in the 
next two sections.
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Figure 1: Stock Market Trends in Korea 
2 January 2007–27 April 2009
Sources: Bloomberg LP and CEIC Data Company Ltd.
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Risks and Uncertainties from the Global 
Environment
The global financial system remains under stress 
despite significant policy actions since the summer 
of 2007. As is well documented by now, the crisis 
has spread well beyond the U.S. subprime market, 
and has affected banks and a wide range of financial 
intermediaries. Moreover, the crisis has also spread 
to a broad range of financial assets, including cor-
porate high-grade and high-yield bonds and large 
segments of the securitized financing sector. Policy 
interventions have included substantial provision 
of liquidity in many countries as well as support in 
the form of new capital, guarantees, and programs 
to deal with distressed assets. The policy responses 
have been effective in alleviating some of the ex-
treme stress observed in September–October of 
2008, but markets continue to remain under strain. 
Conditions have been further exacerbated by the 
financial stress linked directly to the deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions.
The global outlook is likely to remain unfavorable 
for some time, and risks remain tilted to the down-
side. Of particular concern is the adverse feedback 
loop between deteriorating financial conditions 
and weaker economic activity. Arresting this spiral 
is a challenging task for policymakers, requiring 
the whole range of fiscal, monetary, and financial 
policies. At the same time, given the high level of 
uncertainty, there is a risk fiscal and monetary poli-
cies may prove less effective than hoped if rising 
precautionary savings lower fiscal multipliers and 
steps to ease funding costs fail to slow the pace of 
deleveraging. On the upside, however, strong policy 
implementation that is able to convince economic 
agents that economic and financial strains are being 
dealt with decisively could revive confidence.
Given this, Korea’s economy faces the possibility 
of further negative global spillovers through the 
financial and trade channels. Tighter global financial 
conditions imply that cross-border flows could re-
main under pressure for some time to come, raising 
the cost and reducing the availability of financing 
for banks and corporations. Moreover, slower global 
growth would have a direct negative impact on the 
demand for Korean exports.
Risks and Uncertainties from Domestic Sources
In addition to some of the global risks identified 
above, the Korean economy is also exposed to a 
number of vulnerabilities that originate from do-
mestic factors.
The financial system as a whole remains sound, with 
high capital cushions of 12 percent of risk-weighted 
assets at end-2008. However, Korean banks have 
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some of the highest loan-to-deposit ratios in the 
region, reflecting an ongoing shift away from bank 
deposits by households and a refocus of the banks’ 
business model (Figure 4). These factors have, in 
turn, significantly increased the banking system’s 
reliance on wholesale funding, which amounts to 
approximately 40 percent of total liabilities and in-
cludes foreign-sourced financing. Moreover, banks 
account for 75 percent of Korea’s short-term exter-
nal debt. As a result, concerns about banks’ ability 
to roll over external debt obligations contributed to 
the elevated credit spreads on Korean banks follow-
ing the September 2008 spike in market volatility. 
However, a large segment of short-term debt relates 
to foreign exchange hedging provided by banks to 
shipbuilders and other exporters, and this segment 
has offsetting foreign exchange receivables. Korean 
banks also have stringent liquidity requirements, 
implying a close maturity match between short-term 
won and foreign currency–denominated liabilities 
and assets. The nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio of 
banks remains very low, at around 1 percent. Al-
though it has risen marginally recently, provisioning 
against NPLs appears broadly adequate so far.
The second key risk to the outlook is from the corpo-
rate sector, and from SMEs in particular. The SME 
sector has benefited from several years of strong 
credit growth and is economically important, as it 
accounts for close to 90 percent of employment and 
50 percent of manufacturing output. However, the 
universe of SMEs spans a wide range of enterprises, 
from chaebol suppliers and shipbuilders for bulk 
cargo, to micro enterprises at the family level. Ac-
cording to the Bank of Korea, in 2007, well before 
the current turmoil began, some 44 percent of SMEs 
did not have sufficient earnings to cover interest 
payments; this has likely worsened although the 
majority of these SMEs are very small and make up 
only a minor share of bank lending. Nevertheless, 
given the depth of the projected downturn, distress 
in SMEs could potentially affect a large number of 
employees and increase the number of NPLs in the 
banking system.
Third, Korean households’ indebtedness has in-
creased faster than income in recent years. It is 
relatively high, at nearly 70 percent of GDP, and 
in most cases the interest rate is adjustable. This 
makes household balance sheets sensitive to credit 
and income shocks. Moreover, the rollover of mort-
gage loans and expiration of grace periods on newer 
amortizing loans could pose challenges in a tighter 
credit environment. Further to this, household bal-
ance sheets face risks associated with rising unem-
ployment and downside risks to housing prices. 
That being said, housing prices did not rise nearly 
as much as elsewhere in the region, partly because 
the housing market started softening back in early 
2007. Households also benefit from relatively low 
mortgage loan-to-value ratios of less than 50 per-
cent, and mortgage delinquency ratios remain low 
at around 0.7 percent, even though they have been 
edging up recently.
Finally, an adverse feedback loop between the fi-
nancial sector and the real economy could reinforce 
these risks. With banks directly impacted by the 
current downturn through investment losses, tighter 
funding conditions, and a more uncertain economic 
environment, they may well tighten lending stan-
dards and scale back credit to corporations and 
households. This will aggravate conditions for the 
corporate sector, in particular SMEs, and households 
already affected by the economic downturn. In turn, 
this could feed back to banks through a deteriora-
tion in asset quality and capitalization, leading to a 
further pullback in credit, and so on. Although bank 
lending to the private sector still grew annually by 
around 10 percent in March, the growth rate has 
declined significantly in recent months, especially 
for lending to SMEs.
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challenges of managing the downturn
To cushion the impact from the negative global eco-
nomic spillovers and lessen the adverse feedback loop 
between the financial and real sectors, policy action 
should be comprehensive and focus on safeguarding 
the stability of the financial system, containing the 
vulnerability of the corporate sector, and supporting 
domestic demand.
In managing the downturn, financial sector policies 
should broadly focus on two objectives, containment 
and resolution:
• Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the 
fall of 2008, domestic and foreign exchange liquid-
ity tightened for banks with large wholesale financ-
ing requirements, and foreign investors retrenched 
from even liquid money markets, including Ko-
rea’s. The immediate objective of policymakers 
was to contain the fallout from the crisis and fore-
stall widespread panic. To this effect, the Korean 
authorities took a number of key steps: the Bank 
of Korea bolstered liquidity by injecting both won 
and U.S. dollar liquidity in the markets; liquidity 
facilities were expanded; and swap facilities, each 
worth close to $30 billion, were set up with the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank 
of China. Further to this, the Korean authorities ex-
tended deposit insurance to cover foreign exchange 
deposits, and the government guaranteed domestic 
banks’ external debt incurred between 20 October 
2008 and end-2009 (for a period of five years and 
up to $100 billion).
• Korean authorities have also taken a number of 
steps to support resolution of distressed assets 
and recapitalization of financial institutions. The 
state-run Korean Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO) has been charged with buying up NPLs, 
including from savings banks, and, as recently 
announced, will manage a 40 trillion won fund 
set up to purchase distressed corporate bonds and 
assets from financial institutions. A recapitalization 
fund of 20 trillion won has also been established, 
allowing banks to boost their capital in exchange 
for hybrid bonds, subordinated bonds, and preferred 
shares. In addition to these measures, it will be 
important to continue close monitoring of financial 
institutions, undertake enhanced stress-testing exer-
cises to identify vulnerable institutions, and ensure 
that the contingency framework is calibrated to 
deal with any further stress to the system, including 
through a comprehensive prompt-corrective action 
and resolution framework.
The current economic downturn and vulnerabilities 
in the Korean corporate sector, in particular the SME 
sector, call for steps to reduce the near-term risks of 
an adverse feedback loop between rising corporate 
bankruptcies and tightened bank lending. To relieve 
near-term pressures on SMEs, the authorities have 
focused on securing continued availability of credit, 
including by encouraging banks to roll over all SME 
debt maturing in 2009 (approximately 160 trillion 
won), expanding government guarantees through 
government agencies, and boosting SME lending 
through state-owned banks. Liquidity in the domestic 
corporate bond and equity markets has also been sup-
ported through a number of initiatives, including bans 
on short selling of stocks, stepped-up investments in 
the local bond markets by the National Pension Fund 
and Korea Investment Corporation, and plans to abol-
ish withholding taxes for foreigners on interest earned 
on local bonds.
Macroeconomic policies are needed to support do-
mestic demand and reinforce the efforts undertaken 
to stabilize the financial system and corporate sector. 
The authorities have been very proactive on this front. 
The Bank of Korea has eased monetary policy aggres-
sively, lowering policy rates by 325 basis points to 2 
percent since October of 2008. Further to this, fiscal 
policy has been loosened with the introduction of a 
fiscal stimulus package worth around 2.1 percent of 
GDP as part of the 2009 budget. Cuts in income taxes 
and investment tax credits account for around half 
of the package, and the expenditure measures focus 
mostly on infrastructure and SME support. It will be 
important, however, to supplement these with addi-
tional fiscal policy stimulus to cushion the slowdown, 
and the relatively low public debt ratio at 34 percent 
of GDP allows for this. Indeed, the government has 
already proposed a supplementary budget focusing on 
new spending measures worth around 1.7 percent of 
GDP, including outlays to support low-income families 
and SMEs, and additional infrastructure spending. The 
concentration on expenditure measures is welcome, as 
these are generally found to have the largest impact on 
demand, especially outlays on infrastructure and tar-
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6 THE KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE
geted transfers to liquidity-constrained households 
and businesses. Temporary investment tax credits 
can also be relatively effective. Although income 
tax cuts tend to have smaller multipliers, they can 
often be implemented quickly and will also serve 
to support economic growth when the recovery is 
under way. With inflation expectations under con-
trol, there may be some scope for further monetary 
easing through rate cuts and quantitative measures 
to boost liquidity should downside risks come to the 
fore. Interest rates are already low, however, and 
monetary policy effectiveness may be somewhat 
constrained by weakening bank balance sheets.
It is crucial that current policy actions be consistent 
with Korea’s long-term economic objectives:
• It will be important for the financial sector to 
come out of this as sound, efficient, and dynamic. 
In turn, this requires steps to limit moral hazard 
and facilitate exit strategies from large-scale 
public interventions, including to ensure a smooth 
transition back to full private intermediation in 
dislocated markets. Lower leverage and a some-
what smaller financial sector seem inevitable, 
and current actions should not impede necessary 
restructuring of the system as a whole. As in other 
countries, it is also important to now revisit the 
regulatory and supervisory framework to reflect 
lessons learned from the current crisis, including 
giving consideration to counter-cyclical capital 
adequacy ratios.
• Strong efforts to restructure the corporate sector, 
especially the weak SME sector, are essential to 
allow for a faster recovery and higher potential 
growth over the medium term. To help facili-
tate this, the government has pursued financial 
institution–led restructuring, promoted market-
based efforts to set up a corporate restructuring 
fund, introduced tax exemptions to facilitate 
restructuring, and announced the establishment 
of the 40-trillion-won KAMCO-managed fund 
mentioned earlier. The authorities’ efforts could 
be further strengthened if a more differentiated 
approach to SME restructuring was followed, 
given the varied nature of these companies. Such 
an approach could involve a bank-led restructur-
ing for small and medium-sized SMEs to capital-
ize on banks’ often in-depth knowledge of the 
debtor’s business, and a market-based solution 
for large SMEs, able to attract strategic investors 
such as private equity firms, venture capitalists, 
or distressed-asset funds.
• While temporary fiscal stimulus is key for 
cushioning the slowdown and bringing about a 
faster recovery, it is crucial that the government 
remain mindful of the long-term fiscal pressures 
associated with aging and the need to resume 
fiscal consolidation over the medium term.2 
Moreover, signaling continued commitment to 
fiscal prudence will help bolster the effective-
ness of current stimulus efforts by safeguarding 
fiscal credibility. Preparing a medium-term fiscal 
consolidation plan consistent with long-term sus-
tainability and presenting it to the public would 
be important in this regard.
conclusion
This year and next will be challenging for Korea’s 
economy. The outlook for the global economy and 
financial system is surrounded by a high level of 
uncertainty, and a worse-than-expected outcome 
is possible with implications for Korea’s globally 
integrated economy. Risks from domestic sources 
are also present and could be reinforced through an 
adverse feedback loop between the financial sector 
and real economy. Compared with the Asian crisis 
of the late 1990s, the Korean economy faces these 
challenges from a position of relative strength: 
foreign exchange reserves are high, the financial 
sector is generally sound, and larger corporations 
have deleveraged and are less vulnerable to foreign 
exchange risk than in the past. Moreover, the Korean 
government has taken decisive and timely steps to 
address the fallout from the crisis through proactive 
and mutually reinforcing financial sector and macro-
economic policies. Korean policymakers have also 
demonstrated readiness to take further measures as 
needed. Although there is considerable uncertainty 
about when the global recovery will take place, the 
strong fundamentals and policy steps taken so far 
2. Ibid.
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have positioned Korea well for a solid recovery 
when the global tide turns. Indeed, the flexibility 
and resilience of the economy could enable Korea 
to be among the first countries to bounce back from 
the current downturn.
Dr. Lall is Chief of the Korea Division in the Asia 
and Pacific Department of the IMF. Mr. Eskesen 
is Desk Economist for Korea and the Philippines 
in that Department. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the International Monetary 
Fund or International Monetary Fund policy. The 
projections and views expressed in this paper are 
based on statistical information available through 
late April 2009.
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